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CASE SUMMARIES*
ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
Vein Miller's client sued R.A. Nelson, M.D. for medical malpractice.
After the trial court dismissed the action, Nelson sued Miller for malicious
prosecution and negligence in Miller's failure to investigate the facts of the
case independently of the client's statement of them. The Kansas Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim, but it
reinstated the malicious prosecution action. The court held that prior to
bringing suit, an attorney must investigate the facts of a client's claim in-
dependently of the client's statement of them; otherwise, he may be sub-
ject to malicious prosecution liability if he files a groundless suit.
To find Miller could have been liable for malicious prosecution for su-
ing Nelson without probable cause and with malice, the Kansas court first
disregarded Miller's belief that he had probable cause to sue and inferred
that the facts he should have known, i.e., the ones that his independent in-
vestigation would have revealed, did not give him probable cause to
believe his client's claim was actionable. Second, because investigation
would have shown that the claim was not actionable and because bringing
a groundless suit violates Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, Miller could not have intended to secure proper ad-
judication of the claim by bringing suit; therefore, he could have filed the
suit with malice, as defined in section 674 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
Miller is the first malicious prosecution action to base an inference of
malice on ordinary negligence. The precedential value of this decision is
uncertain, however, because Miller expressly overrules Maechtlen v.
Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 250 P. 303 (1926), which quoted extensively from
Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887). Peck is still strong
authority in Missouri and other jurisdictions; it seems unlikely that
Missouri will follow Kansas and overrule Peck. Nonetheless, the attorney
should be aware of this potential source of liability, especially if any of his
practice extends into Kansas.
The weakest part of the decision is the translation of Miller's
negligence in investigating the facts into an intent in filing suit for reasons
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other than securing proper adjudication of the claim. Intentional conduct
does not embrace merely negligent conduct. It is a contradiction in terms,
therefore, to find a person "intentionally negligent" - to find that after
negligently investigating his client's story and obtaining facts that Miller
believed supported a cause of action, he then intended to file a baseless
complaint.
In response to this decision, attorneys will face a difficult decision in
marginal cases: not to sue, independently investigate, or risk liability by
bringing suit without independent investigation.
KEVIN R. SWEENEY
"SINGLE PRODUCT" SECONDARY CONSUMER
PICKETING. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S.
607 (1980) (Safeco).
Local 1001 struck Safeco Title Insurance Company and extended
their picketing to five local title companies. The picketers passed out
handbills that asked customers to cancel their Safeco policies. Each title
company derived approximately ninety percent of its gross.income from
selling Safeco insurance.
The NLRB found the title companies to be "neutrals" and the
picketing to be an illegal secondary boycott. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the title com-
panies were neutrals. Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that the
picketing was protected under the Tree Fruits doctrine, which was an-
nounced in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964) fTree Fruits)._In Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court interpreted sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act to allow consumer
picketing of a secondary employer under certain circumtances. Secondary
consumer picketing was declared legal if targeted at the struck product
and not at the secondary employer. In Safeco, the court of appeals found
that the Tree Fruits rule protected the single product picketing, even
though the economic impact on the secondary employer would be essen-
tially the same as a boycott directed at the employer.
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' position. The Court
noted that unlike Tree Fruits, the Safeco picketed product represented
almost all of the neutral's business. Because customers could not have
heeded the boycott without withholding their patronage entirely, the
picketing effected a total boycott of a neutral. The Court viewed this activ-
ity as a plain violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), which forbids coercion of
neutrals to induce them to cease dealing with the struck employer.
The Court formulated a new test to determine whether secondary con-
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sumer picketing targeted at the primary employer's product is coercive
and therefore unlawful. Under the new test, picketing is unlawful if the
targeted product is of such importance to the neutral that "ruin or
substantial loss" reasonably would be expected. This rule will apply not
only to single product picketing, but also when the struck product is a ma-
jor product in a neutral's business. As a result, the ruin or substantial loss
test sets the stage for increased emphasis on establishment of economic
facts concerning the importance of a product to a neutral business.
CLYDE W. CURTIS
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